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Abstract
This paper uses over two years of weekly scanner data from two small US cities to
characterize time and state dependence of grocers' pricing decisions. In these data, the
probability of a nominal adjustment declines with the time since the last price change
even after controlling for heterogeneity across store-product cells and replacing sale
prices with regular prices. We also detect state dependence: The probability of a nom-
inal adjustment is highest when a store's price substantially diers from the average of
other stores' prices. However, extreme prices typically re
ect the selling store's recent
nominal adjustments rather than changes in other stores' prices.
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This paper measures time and state dependence in grocers' pricing decisions using scanner
data. The observations cover most transactions of items in ve product categories in two
Midwestern cities. These weekly records allow accurate calculation of the age of an item's
price and of the corresponding prices paid at other stores.
Twenty-three percent of the prices in these data change in an average week. If the prob-
ability of a nominal adjustment remains the same as a price ages, then this implies that the
average price lasts about four weeks. However, a randomly chosen price remains unchanged
for more than eight weeks. The discrepancy between these duration estimates re
ects a fact
at odds with familiar macroeconomic models of pricing: the frequency of nominal adjust-
ment declines with the time since the last price change. We nd this counterintuitive time
dependence even after controlling for heterogeneity in price 
exibility across products and
stores. That is, occasional spells of 
exibility punctuate otherwise rigid prices.
Models of state-dependent pricing { such as those of Barro (1972); Sheshinski and Weiss
(1977); Caplin and Spulber (1987); Caplin and Leahy (1991); and Dotsey, King, and Wolman
(1999) { imply that the benet of a nominal adjustment is highest when the price diers
substantially from other sellers' prices. Our ndings reproduce this qualitatively: Increasing
the dierence between an item's price and the average price for the same item at other stores
substantially raises the probability of a price change. However, the probability of changing
a price close to average far exceeds zero, and most price changes occur with the original
price close to average. In simple menu-cost models, extreme prices arise from the erosion of
a xed nominal price by other sellers' adjustments. Therefore, they are older than average.
We nd that most extreme prices are relatively young (less than a month old). That is,
grocers deliberately select extreme prices which they then quickly abandon. Taken together
these results suggest to us that sellers extensively experiment with their prices.
Many papers that examine price data collected to construct the CPI precede this work.
Examples from the Euro zone, Israel, Poland, and the United States include Dhyne et al.
1(2006), Lach and Tsiddon (1992), Konieczny and Skrzpacz (2005), and Klenow and Kryvtsov
(2005). These micro-CPI data record the prices for many more items than do the scanner
data we employ. We therefore view this paper as complementing earlier studies by looking
at a narrower but richer set of data. Our data are weekly. This is an advantage over the
monthly CPI data because stores typically change prices more than once in a single month.
Furthermore, our data are more detailed than CPI data. In Bils and Klenow (2004) for
example, there is one product category called \margarine". We examine the pricing of 62
specic margarine products. This allows us to construct the relevant comparisons of prices
across stores required for measuring state dependence. Finally, scanners directly measure
transaction prices with little human intervention; unlike BLS enumerators.
Dutta, Bergen, and Levy (2002) and Chevalier, Kashyap, and Rossi (2003) examined
scanner data of prices at a single Chicago supermarket chain. These observations share the
high frequency of the data we employ, and in addition they record the supermarket's markup
over wholesale cost. The advantage of this paper's data arises from their coverage of multiple
sellers. In leveraging this feature, we follow Kashyap (1995). He compared price adjustments
of three retailers selling a few identical items. Our work examines 135 grocery products each
sold in ve or more stores.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the source
of the data and how we use it to detect nominal price changes. It also presents summary
statistics and foretells our results with the behavior of the price for a specic item at one
store. Section 3 measures time dependence of pricing decisions, and Section 4 studies the
dependence of price changes on stores' relative prices. Section 5 unies the study of time and
state dependence by estimating linear regression models of the decision to change a nominal
price. Section 6 discusses the robustness of our results to dierent measurement strategies.
Section ?? examines how wholesale price dynamics and price synchronization impact our
results, and Section 7 oers concluding remarks.
22 Data
Our data source is the ERIM scanner data set collected by A.C. Nielsen. The James M. Kilts
Center for Marketing at the University of Chicago's Graduate School of Business graciously
makes these data available on its web site.1 Nielsen collected these data from two small
Midwestern cities - Springeld, Missouri and Sioux Falls, South Dakota - from the fth week
of 1985 through the twenty-third week of 1987. The data come from the checkout scanners of
these cities' supermarkets and drug stores. The sample includes observations from 19 stores
in Springeld and 23 stores in Sioux Falls. Together, they account for about 80 percent
of the two markets' grocery and drug retail sales. We identify a product with a Universal
Product Code (UPC). These dier across dierent packagings of the same good (e.g. 8 oz.
and 16 oz. sizes) and across dierent varieties of that good (e.g. 
avored and un
avored
margarine). For each product in six categories - ketchup, margarine, peanut butter, sugar,
toilet tissue, and tuna - the data record the revenues from the sales of that product as well as
the quantity sold at each store. Nielsen also issued identication cards to approximately 10
percent of each city's households. These customers presented their cards at stores' checkout
counters, and Nielsen used the resulting observations to construct household-level purchase
histories. These allow us to observe the exact transaction prices and locations for goods
purchased by these households.
Our baseline measure of a good's price in a particular store is average revenue per unit,
because records of individual stores' prices constructed from households' purchase histories
are incomplete for all but the most popular products and stores. The measure of revenues
equals the amount the store would have received at the register if customers had redeemed
no coupons, so changes in coupon redemption do not directly in
uence these price measures.
We refer to a specic product sold in a given store as a store-product cell (or simply cell
whenever this does not lead to confusion). The ERIM data contain 271;028 price observa-
tions from cells with sales in both the rst and last sample weeks. We call these continuing
1The data can be found at http://research.chicagobooth.edu/marketing/databases/erim/.
3cells.2 A store might not sell a given product to any household during a particular week.
In that case, we do not observe a transaction price. The sample of store-product cells with
positive sales in every sample week contains only 89;175 prices and accounts for 52 percent
of continuing cells' sales. We believe that this is too exclusive a sample for our purposes,
so we also use data from all cells with spells of missing data that last no longer than two
weeks per spell. For a store-product-week with no sales, we assume that the price equals the
most recently observed price. The resulting sample includes 203;811 observations, of which
3;009 are imputed with the most recently observed price. They account for 84 percent of
all continuing cells' sales. The nal criterion for inclusion of a product in our sample is that
no fewer than ve stores sold it in any week. This eliminates 24;846 prices from the data.
The comparison prices allow us to determine whether a store's price is close to other stores'
prices for the same good, and they need not appear in our nal data set. 3
2.1 Measuring Price Changes
The nal balanced panel has 178;965 prices, and they account for 75 percent of continuing
cells' sales.4 The division of revenues by units sold yielded 39;919 prices which cannot be
expressed in whole cents (e.g. $1:3529). Such a fractional price could arise either from
technical mistakes in price setting or from time aggregation. Technical errors occur when
the price displayed in the store diers from that in the computer. For example, suppose that
a store manager decided to change the price on Monday from $1.29 to $1.40. The price must
2These data also contain 436;357 prices from store-product cells without sales in both the rst and last
sample weeks. The pricing and sales dynamics of such cells is of substantial independent interest, but the
complete analysis of the decision to introduce or retire a product oering lies well beyond the scope of this
paper.
3We have also created versions of every table and gure in this paper using only the 89;175 prices from
complete store-product cells. Although those estimates are somewhat less precise than those reported here,
they lead us to the same conclusions.
4Because the sample is so large, all estimated means we report below are statistically signicant at
conventional levels.
4be changed both on the computer and on the shelf. Suppose that erroneously it changes
only on the computer. Then those customers who notice the lower price on the shelf will
complain and receive the item for $1.29, while others who are less attentive will pay $1.40.
At some point, the store will correct the shelf price, but the earlier mixing can nevertheless
result in an average price of $1.3529.5
The data weeks begin with Monday, so a fractional price can also arise from time ag-
gregation when a store manager changes an item's price during the middle of a week. To
illustrate this possibility, change the previous example to suppose that the manager changes
the price from $1.29 to $1.40 successfully on a Wednesday. Those customers buying the
good on Monday or Tuesday would pay $1.29 while those buying later would pay $1.40. We
might therefore observe in the second week a fractional price like $1.3529 as a result of time
aggregation. The average revenue price changes twice in three weeks, while the daily price
in the computer changes only once. The spurious price change arises because the second
week's average revenue embodies two prices.
To address these problems we replaced fractional prices by the minimum price in the
individual purchase history data whenever this was possible. In our example, if we observe
three consumers purchasing the item in the second week for $1.29, $1.29, and $1.40 we
change the second week's price to $1.29. This was done for 26;051 prices out of the 39;919
fractional prices in the data.6 For the remaining prices that we could not replace, we checked
whether they are part of a descending or increasing sequence of prices (as in the example).
5The Federal Trade Commission executed two studies of scanner accuracy in 1996 and 1998. These
dened an error as we have here: a failure of the scanned price to match the lowest posted price in the store.
In 1996, the error rate from a sample of randomly selected items was 4:82 percent. In 1998 this dropped to
3:35 percent. The original studies are available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/scanner1/scanners.htm and
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/scanner2/scanner2.htm.
6The purchase history gives us multiple prices for 5;982 of the available 26;051 prices, and the median
range among those that are dierent is 17 cents. Therefore, we have also experimented with using the
maximum available purchase-history price. This changes none of our results substantially.
5Figure 1: The Price of Fleischmann's Margarine(i)


























Average of Prices at Other Stores
Note: (i) Weekly observations of the price of Fleischmann's Margarine at a store in Sioux Falls, South Dakota
and the average of all other stores' prices for the identical product. Dates are the nal days of the given
week.
If the fractional price was a part of a monotone sequence we concluded that it is likely to
be the result of time aggregation and replaced the fractional price by the following week's
price. Applying this rule to our example changes the price of $1.3529 in week 2 to $1.40;
and the number of price changes in the corrected data is accurate. We changed 3;126 prices
in this manner. Average-revenue prices that were not in whole cents but were either greater
than or less than both the previous and following week's prices were rounded to the nearest
whole cent but otherwise left unchanged. If we change our example so that the store lowers
the price from $1.40 to $1.26 on the beginning of week 3 and maintains this price through
week 3, then the three weeks' average prices are $1.29, $1.3529, and $1.26. We count two
price changes after rounding the second week's price down to $1.35, as actually occurred.
6Figure 1 plots one store's price of a single product (Fleischmann's Margarine) along with
the average of all other store's prices for the same item.7 This price changed 42 times during
the 123 week sample. It begins at $1:06, and it rises to $1:09 in April of 1985, and remains
roughly constant for the rest of the year. The average of other rms' prices approximately
equaled $1:10 throughout these eleven months. The price changed much more often in
1986. After two very modest price increases in January, the price dropped to $0:92 for four
weeks and then returned to $1:09. Throughout these changes, the average price at other
stores 
uctuated little. The return to $1:09 lasted only seven weeks. In April, the price
entered a period with very frequent changes that ended only in October. At that point, it
approximately settled at $1:15. The year ended with a dramatic temporary price increase.
In 1987, the price returned to a pattern of much less frequent price changes. It ended the
sample period at $1:15.
The Figure shows seven price increases that last exactly one week and are followed by a
return to the original price. Those are fractional prices that were not corrected because there
were no purchase history data to replace them and they are not within a monotone sequence
of prices. However we suspect that these observations might not be real price changes. If
these are indeed \mistakes" they would aect our calculations of the weekly frequency. It
would change from 42=123 = 0:34 to 28=123 = 0:23. We thought of replacing all prices which
follow and preceed exactly the same price with that common bracketing price, but doing so
might be imposing too much of our prior on the data: A manager could decide to increase
the price, realize that this leads to a loss of revenues, and revert to the previous price after
a week. With this in mind, we leave such prices unchanged. However, we check our results'
robustness to treating such one-week price increases as mistakes in Section 6.
7Here and throughout the paper, we construct the average of all other stores' prices for the same item by
dividing total sales of the item across all other stores by the number of units sold by those stores.
7Table 1: Summary Statistics
Number of Number of Frequency of Annualized Rate
Category UPCs Observed Prices Sale Prices of Price Change
All Products 135 178,965 3.4 -2.4
Ketchup 6 7,626 4.7 0.4
Margarine 62 99,753 2.4 -3.6
Peanut Butter 13 9,840 4.0 10.9
Sugar 14 14,268 4.0 -0.5
Tissue 12 13,407 5.0 -4.4
Tuna 28 34,071 4.8 -3.1
2.2 Summary Statistics
Before proceeding to examine price changes, we document some of the scanner data set's
most salient characteristics. Table 1 provides summary statistics for the sample we use. Its
rst two columns report the number of products observed by category and the number of
prices recorded. The sample includes observations of 135 products, and most of these are
either margarine or tuna.
The third column of Table 1 reports the fraction of prices that we identify as sale prices.
We wish to ensure that this paper's results do not merely re
ect rms' switching between sale
and \regular" prices, because some authors discount these as variation arising from a simple
pricing rule which ignores available macroeconomic information rather than a conscious
change in that rule. To identify sales, we look for price declines of 10 percent or more in
a given week that the store completely reverses within 2 weeks. All prices between the
initial decline and the reversal are sale prices. With this criterion, only 3:4 percent of the
observations are sale prices. Tissue's frequency of sale prices, 5:0 percent, exceeds that of
any other category. Klenow and Kryvtsov (2005) report that the BLS identies 15 percent
of food prices collected to produce the CPI as sale prices. Either the stores in our sample
8Figure 2: In
ation Rates for Margarine(i)

























  Scanner Data Index
National CPI
Note: (i) Annualized monthly in
ation rates.
use sale prices relatively infrequently or the BLS uses a more liberal denition of a sale.8
Table 1's nal column reports the annualized average rates of price change in percentage
points. We nd this of interest because in
ation expectations impact rms' price choices. The
prices in all categories but Peanut Butter declined over the sample period. The corresponding
average annual growth rate of the consumer price index for margarine is  1:7 percent.
The matching CPI's for the other categories all display price growth, so the de
ation in
Springeld and Sioux Falls did not typify the national experience.
Aggregate 
uctuations in in
ation also concern price-setting producers. To illustrate
the sort of aggregate 
uctuations facing the sample's stores, Figure 2 plots two monthly
measures of annualized in
ation for margarine over the scanner data's sample period. The
rst measure uses a geometric average xed-weight price index conceptually similar to the
8This procedure identies none of the prices in Figure 1 as sale prices.
9Table 2: Standard Deviations of Log Prices(i),(ii)
fUPC  Market  Dateg
S
Category fUPCg fUPC  Marketg ; fUPC  Storeg fUPC  Store  Saleg
All Products 14.6 14.2 10.8 9.6 9.0
Ketchup 14.7 13.2 10.1 9.2 8.8
Margarine 13.7 13.4 9.9 8.8 8.3
Peanut Butter 13.8 13.7 8.0 7.5 7.0
Sugar 11.9 11.1 7.5 7.3 6.2
Tissue 12.9 12.4 8.1 7.3 6.7
Tuna 18.4 18.0 15.4 13.6 12.6
Notes: (i) The table reports residual standard deviations in percentage points from the regressions of the
price's logarithm against the given set of regressors. (ii) In the table, fX;Yg indicates a set of dummy
variables that span the unique combinations of the values of X and Y.
CPI. We built this with the scanner data following the procedure of Richardson (2003). The
second measure is the margarine CPI itself. The CPI-based in
ation varies much less than
the scanner-based in
ation. Their standard deviations are 11:0 and 119:0 percent. Their
sample correlation is 0:35, which suggests that location-specic shocks dominate the scanner-
data based price index. We could not locate a national-level CPI for toilet tissue. The other
categories' scanner-based in
ation rates also display considerably greater variance than their
corresponding CPI-based rates.
Next, consider the variability of prices across stores and time. The rst column of Table
2 reports residuals' standard deviations from a regression of the price's logarithm against a
set of 135 UPC dummy variables. The rst row reports the residuals' standard deviation
for all of the observations, and the remaining rows report the standard deviations for each
category's residuals. These range from 11:9 percent for Sugar to 18:4 percent for Tuna.
The table's remaining columns report residual standard deviations from regressions that
include progressively richer sets of dummy variables. The regression underlying the second
10column's results includes two sets of 135 UPC dummy variables, one set for each market.
This accounting for systematic dierences between prices in Springeld and Sioux Falls
lowers the standard deviations little. The regression for the third column includes one set of
UPC dummy variables for each market and week for a total of 135  2  123 dummies. As
Figure 2 suggests, removing date-specic means substantially lowers variation. For example,
margarine's standard deviation drops from 13:4 percent to 9:9 percent. Because (9:9=13:4)2
approximately equals one half, the cross-sectional variance of prices at a given date and the
time-series variance of the average price across dates roughly equal each other.
Table 2's nal two columns further decompose the cross-sectional dispersion of prices.
The regression used for the fourth column adds store-specic UPC dummies that are invariant
across time to the regression in the third column. The average UPC has approximately
10:8 stores, so this adds 1455  135  10:8 dummy variables. We expect these dummies to
substantially reduce the standard deviation if stores consistently follow \low-price" or \high-
price" strategies.9 In fact, adding store-specic UPC dummies lowers the standard deviation
at most 1:8 percentage point. This indicates that there are few systematic dierences in the
prices for a given product across either markets or stores. The nal column quanties the
contribution of stores switching between sale prices and regular prices to price dispersion.
For this, we added two sets of store-specic UPC dummies to the regression from the third
column, one for regular prices and another for sale prices (a total of 2  1455 dummies).
Accounting for the dierences between sale and regular prices lowers the standard deviations
somewhat, but overall Table 2 indicates that substantial price dispersion remains even after
controlling for heterogeneity across markets, stores, products, and weeks.
Next we consider the frequency of price changes, which Table 3 reports. The rst column
gives the weekly average fraction of prices that changed for the whole sample and each of
the six categories. Overall, 23 percent of prices change in a given week. The second column
9Because the store-specic dummies also vary across UPC's, this regression will account for persistent
heterogeneity across stores in the pricing of particular items that does not re
ect store-wide pricing strategies.
11Table 3: The Frequency of Price Changes(i)
Weekly Data
Category Original Data Sales Replaced(ii) Monthly Data(iii) Bils-Klenow(iv)
All Products 23 20 39 26
Ketchup 25 20 46 20
Margarine 23 21 39 28
Peanut Butter 27 22 46 31
Sugar 19 14 33 23
Tissue 21 16 41 24
Tuna 24 19 38 27
Notes (i) The table's entries are frequencies expressed in percentage points. (ii) The observations used to
calculate this column's results have sale prices replaced with the most recent non-sale (or \regular") price.
(iii) Monthly observations are constructed by using the price of each store-product cell in the rst week of
each calendar month. (iv) The entries in this column are the frequencies of price changes reported in Table
1 of Bils and Klenow (2004) for the respective categories. See Footnote 10 in the text for more information
regarding the mapping of the ERIM categories into BLS categories. The rst frequency in this column is
the simple average of those for the six reported categories.
reports the frequencies after rst replacing sale prices with the most recent non-sale (or
\regular") price. This equals 20 percent for All Products, so most price changes in these
data remain even after accounting for sales. The nal columns compare the price changes in
these data with those tabulated by the BLS while constructing the CPI. The third column
computes the average monthly frequency that is obtained by \visiting" a store during the
rst week of each month, and the last column reports the BLS estimates as reported in Bils
and Klenow (2004).10 If the probability of a price changing did not depend on the price's age,
10Two of the scanner data's categories have identically named BLS item categories, Margarine and Peanut
Butter. We matched Ketchup with \Other condiments (excl olives, pickles, and relishes)," Sugar with \Sugar
and articial sweeteners," Tissue with \Cleaning and toilet tissue, paper towels, napkins," and Tuna with
12Table 4: Estimates of Average Price Durations(i)
Average Durations(ii) Inverse Frequency Estimates
Category All Prices New Prices Inverse of Average(iii) Average of Inverses(iv)
All Products 8.3 4.3 4.3 5.5
Ketchup 6.7 3.8 4.0 4.7
Margarine 8.2 4.4 4.3 5.5
Peanut Butter 7.0 3.8 3.7 4.3
Sugar 10.1 4.8 5.2 6.7
Tissue 7.0 4.5 4.7 6.0
Tuna 9.2 3.9 4.1 5.1
Note: (i) Table entries measured in weeks. (ii) These columns report the average duration of prices set in
the sample's rst 85 weeks. (iii) This column reports the inverses of the weekly frequencies from the rst
column of Table 3. (iv) This column reports the average of inverse price frequencies calculated for each
store-product cell.
as in the Calvo (1983) model of price adjustment, then the weekly frequencies we observe
would imply that 65 percent of prices change in a given month. However, we nd instead
that approximately 39 percent of prices change when sampled monthly. This suggests that
the Calvo assumption of a constant weekly probability of price adjustment does not hold
good in our data. In any case, the prices in our data appear to be somewhat more 
exible
than those in the BLS sample.
Table 4 provides direct and inverse-frequency type estimates of the average price duration.
The rst two columns report direct measures using average realized durations of prices before
the sample's last year. Average duration can only be calculated using completed price spells
without employing strong distributional assumptions, but because the typical price duration
is short relative to the sample period's length, we observe the completion of all but 2 spells
that begin before the sample's last year. The rst column reports the average duration for
\Canned sh or seafood."
13all prices charged. This equals 8:3 weeks for all products. Across categories, it varies from
7:0 weeks for Peanut Butter to 10:1 weeks for Sugar. The second column reports the average
durations of the sample's newly-set prices. This is about half of the average duration for all
prices.
The last two columns of Table 4 provides estimates based on the inverse of the price-
change frequency. The rst of the two is the standard estimate. This is very close to the
average duration for newly set prices.11 Let i denote sample frequency of price changes for
store-product cell i. The inverse-frequency estimate in the third column equals the inverse














That is, the average of the inverse frequencies exceeds the inverse of the average frequency.
Baharad and Eden (2004) argue that if the frequency of price change is cell-specic and
there is no within-cell heterogeneity across time, then the correct measure of duration is the
right-hand side of (1). We report this in Table 4 nal column. In fact, the average of the
inverses lies about half-way between the inverse of the average in the third column and the
direct measure of price duration in the rst column.
3 Time Dependence
We now turn to the measurement of time dependence in grocers' decisions to change nom-
inal prices. For this we use the unconditional hazard function, which plots the adjustment
frequency as a function of the price's age. In the Calvo (1983) model of stochastic price
setting, this function does not vary with the price's age, whereas in the Taylor (1980) model
11In an innite sample, the two estimates equal each other by construction. They dier in Table 4 because
the rst spell (with unknown duration) contributes to the inverse-frequency estimate but not the direct
estimate in the second column and because the direct estimate ignores spells that begin in the sample's last
year.
14Figure 3: Sample Hazard Function for Price Changes
























of staggered pricing it equals zero until the interval of price rigidity passes, at which point it
jumps to one. Standard models of state dependent pricing clearly imply the unconditional
hazard function increases with the price's age for very young prices, because a producer gains
nothing from changing a newly-set and hence optimal price.
Figure 3 plots the unconditional hazard function estimated using the observations from
all product categories. The chance of a newly-set price changing equals 47 percent. As the
price ages, this probability drops precipitously. It equals 32 percent for a two-week-old price
and 21 percent for a three-week-old price. As the price ages further, the hazard function
continues its decline at a more gradual pace. For very old prices, the probability of a price
change equals only 8 percent. The unreported hazard functions calculated separately for
each product category all resemble Figure 3.
If occasional measurement errors (like those we suspect in Figure 1) infect our data, then
they can make the measured hazard function drop, because measuring a single price with
15Figure 4: Example Hazard for Price Changes with Rigid and Flexible Prices
























error induces two sequential \observed" price changes. This only causes the hazard to drop
from one to two weeks, but in the data the drop from one to two weeks only slightly exceeds
that from two to three weeks. Apparently, measurement error alone cannot rationalize the
estimated hazard function's shape.
Heterogeneity provides a simple explanation for the decreasing hazard function. We
illustrate this here with an example adapted from Darby, Haltiwanger, and Plant (1985).
Suppose a price is either 
exible or rigid. Within each type there is a constant probability of
changing the price, but 
exible prices change more frequently. The hazard function initially
re
ects the average probability across the two groups. As a cohort of prices set on a given
date ages, the fraction of rigid prices among the survivors increases. The hazard function
declines (as in Figure 3) and asymptotes to the probability of a rigid price changing. Figure
4 plots the implied raw hazard function from this example. It assumes that 70 percent of all
new prices are 
exible and that the weekly probability of a price change is 65 percent for a
16
exible price and 8 percent for a rigid price. This simple example reproduces Figure 3 well.
We distinguish between two forms of heterogeniety: between-cell and within-cell. Between-
cell heterogeneity re
ects unobservable dierences across stores in their pricing technologies
as well as dierences across products in the volatility of their marginal costs. Kehoe and
Midrigan (2008) and Eichenbaum, Jaimovich, and Rebelo (Forthcoming) provide two exam-
ples of within-cell heterogeneity. In both, some price changes are cheaper than others; and
cheaply-set prices have low durations. To measure the contribution of within-cell hetero-
geneity to the decreasing hazard, we calculated the hazard within each product-store cell for
young prices (with ages less than or equal to 3 weeks) and old prices (with ages greater than
3 weeks). Whenever the hazard for young prices was higher than the hazard for old prices we
said that it is declining. Table 5 displays the fraction of cells that exhibit decreasing hazard
function. Overall, 88:9 percent of cells have a declining hazard. Under the null hypothesis of
a constant hazard, these two estimates have a known asymptotic distribution (as the number
of weeks per cell grows) which allows us to measure the statistical signicance of their dier-
ence.12 About 46:5 percent of cells have slopes that are negative and statistically signicant
at the 5 percent level. Only 1:1 percent of the cells have positive and statistically signicant
slopes. The bottom panel of Table 5 reports the same estimates after rst replacing sale
prices with the most recent non-sale prices. This has no dramatic impact on the results.13
In summary, these data display a counterintuitive form of time dependence in price
setting. Older prices are less likely to change than newly-set prices. This does not merely
re
ect heterogeneity across stores or products in the frequency of price setting. Instead,
hazard functions calculated using only one store-product cell's observations typically decrease
12Under the null hypothesis that the hazard function is constant and equal to , the estimated hazards
for young and old prices from a sample of T weeks' prices are asymtotically normally distributed with








covariance. We base our test on this joint distribution.
13Because a product-store combination denes a cell, the results of Table 5 account for systematic dier-
ences across stores' price change frequencies.
17Table 5: Slopes of Within-Cell Hazard Function(i)
Category < 0 Signicantly < 0 Signicantly > 0
Original Data
All Products 88.9 46.5 1.1
Ketchup 82.3 25.8 0.0
Margarine 87.2 45.9 1.6
Peanut Butter 85.0 37.5 1.2
Sugar 94.0 45.7 0.0
Tissue 89.9 33.0 0.0
Tuna 93.9 61.0 0.7
Sales Replaced with Regular Prices
All Products 88.9 47.8 1.0
Ketchup 83.9 37.1 0.0
Margarine 87.7 45.4 1.2
Peanut Butter 88.8 41.2 1.2
Sugar 95.7 56.9 0.0
Tissue 79.8 35.8 0.9
Tuna 94.2 59.9 1.1
Note: (i) The table's top panel gives the percentage of cells with decreasing sample hazard functions, the
second and third give the percentages with sample hazard functions with statistically signicant negative and
positive slopes. The signicance level used was 5%. The bottom panel mimics the top after rst replacing
sale prices with the most recent non-sale (or \regular") price. A \cell" refers to a product-store combination.
18with the price's age. That is, the price for a given product at a given store switches between
periods of apparent rigidity and 
exibility, as did the price for margarine in Figure 1.
4 State Dependence
Existing models of state-dependent pricing cannot easily generate a decreasing hazard func-
tion like that we observe, because the benet of changing a newly-set price is small and
grows as the price ages. Nevertheless, the insights of state-dependent pricing models might
yet improve our understanding of stores' nominal adjustments. In this section, we examine
this possibility. We use a noisy indicator of the benet of a nominal adjustment, the price
relative to the average of other stores' prices for the same product.14
Figure 5 plots the observed frequency of price changes as a function of the relative price's
logarithm. The relative price equals the ratio of the store's nominal price in the previous
week divided by the sales-weighted average of prices for the same good at all other stores
in the current week. This measures the real gap that a price adjustment in the current
week could close. Before estimation, we accounted for some stores systematically following
high-price or low-price rules by normalizing the mean of each store-product cell's log relative
price to zero. On the horizontal axis, zero indicates a relative price equal to the average for
this store-product cell. We divided the interval [-1/2,1/2] into twenty equally sized bins and
calculated the price change frequency for each of them. The dark solid curve in Figure 5
gives the frequencies for all store-item-week observations. The grey solid gives the analogous
frequencies calculated after rst replacing sale prices with the most recent non-sale price.
For visual reference, the light horizontal line gives the unconditional frequency of a price
change, 23 percent; and the dashed curve plots the sample's distribution of relative prices.
There are four notable features of Figure 5. First, the minimum frequency substantially
exceeds zero. For both samples, it approximately equals 15 percent. Thus, even a store
14One possible objection to this measure of relative prices is that its denominator might include prices
charged at other stores owned by the same rm. We address this below in Section 6.
19Figure 5: Hazard for Price Changes as a Function of the Relative Price(i)


























  Frequency of Price Changes: Original Data
Frequency of Price Changes: Sales Replaced
Distribution of Original Data
Average Frequency
Note: (i) The relative price equals the store's price in the previous week divided by the average of all other
prices for the same UPC charged in the current week.
with an \average" price might change it. Second, rms' prices cluster around the average
of other rms' prices. Together, these two observations strongly suggest that the relative
price cannot substantially improve forecasts of the occurrence of nominal adjustment. Third,
moving the relative price away from its average substantially increases the probability of a
nominal adjustment. The estimated probability of a nominal adjustment is 60 percent when
the price is 35 to 40 percent below the average of others' prices and 53 percent when it is 35
to 40 percent above that average. In this sense, these observations display a basic feature
of menu-cost pricing models. Fourth and nally, replacing sale prices lowers the average
frequency of price changes.15
15Category-specic versions of Figure 5 all display the same features, but the estimated frequencies are
considerably noisier.
20Figure 6: Young and Old Prices' Hazards as Functions of the Relative Price(i)




























Price Change Frequency: Young
Price Change Frequency: Old
Distribution: Young
Distribution: Old
Note: (i) The relative price equals the store's price in the previous week divided by the average of all other
prices for the same UPC charged in the current week. The calculations exclude observations from the initial
(left-censored) price spells. Young prices are dened to be those less than four weeks old.
In light of the negative association of a price's age with the probability that it changes,
Figure 6 plots the frequency of price changes against the mean-adjusted logarithmic relative
price for samples of young prices { those with ages three weeks or less { and for old prices
{ those with ages of four weeks or more. As Figure 3 suggests, the adjustment frequencies
of new prices exceed those of old prices substantially. Furthermore, extreme relative prices
increase the nominal adjustment frequencies of both young and old prices. Figure 6 also plots
the estimated relative-price distributions for both young and old prices. Unsurprisingly, both
of their modes are near the mean of zero. What is surprising is that young prices display
more dispersion than do old prices. Comparing the two distributions' peaks makes this
excess dispersion particularly clear. To quantify this, we calculated the standard deviations
21Figure 7: The Fraction of Young Prices by Relative Price(i)






























Note: (i) Young prices are those with ages less than four weeks. The plotted fractions exclude prices one
week old from both the numerator and denominator.
of both price distributions. These are 16:6 percent and 8:7 percent for young and old prices.
The nding that young prices are more dispersed than old prices comes nowhere near the
standard assumption that all stores changing their prices choose the same price. To examine
this surprising result further we plot in Figure 7 the fraction of young prices as a function of
the relative price. The horizontal line plots the overall fraction of young prices, 46 percent,
for reference. We see that the minimum of 34 percent occurs when the relative price is close
to zero and the fraction of young prices increases with the absolute value of the relative
price. Young prices constitute 71 percent of the prices between 35 and 40 percent below
the average of others' prices and 58 percent of the prices between 35 and 40 percent above
22that average. The results are similar if we exclude one-week-old prices (which might embody
measurement errors) from the analysis. In a standard model, a xed nominal price becomes
extreme as in
ation erodes it. In these data, stores set many extreme relative prices.
5 Forecasting Price Changes
Figure 6 goes some distance towards unifying the consideration of time and state dependence.
This section continues in that direction by presenting forecasting models of the decision to
change a store's nominal price. The estimated models reinforce the ndings above. Quan-
titatively, the price's age contributes more to the models' forecasts than does the relative
price.
All of the models we estimate have the simple linear-in-probabilities form,
Pr[pi;t 6= pi;t 1] = 
0xi;t;
where xi;t is a vector of variables known at the time that pi;t is chosen.16 It includes three
sets of dummy variables spanning the sets of stores, products, and calendar dates, the mean-
adjusted relative price, the inverse of the price's age, and their squares. Finally, it contains
the percentage deviation of the number of units sold by the store in the previous period
from its mean as well as its square. We add these to xi;t because Golosov and Lucas (2007)
emphasize that rms' with high sales have a greater incentive to change prices in their state-
dependent model. We have also experimented with Probit and Logit specications for this
forecasting model and obtained similar results. We use the linear-in-probabilities model to
take advantage of its ease of interpretation.
We estimated the linear-in-probabilities model using ordinary least squares separately
for each category and for the sample as a whole. Table 6 reports the estimated coecients
for the models' regressors of interest, their heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors, and
16This includes the logarithmic relative price dened above, which includes the prices all other stores
charge at time t. We use this for conformity with the analysis in Section 4.
23Table 6: Linear-in-Probabilities Estimates(i)
Relative Price Lagged Units Sold Inverse Age
Category Linear Squared Linear Squared Linear Squared R2
All Products 6.5??? 46.4??? 0.1 -0.1?? 46.4??? -11.1??? 15.4
(1.2) (3.4) (0.2) (0.0) (1.4) (1.3)
Ketchup -15.7??? 70.6??? -2.0?? 0.0 54.6??? -24.2??? 12.2
(5.3) (23.2) (0.9) (0.2) (7.5) (6.6)
Margarine 7.3??? 45.5??? -0.1 0.0 33.2??? 1.8 16.4
(1.7) (4.0) (0.3) (0.0) (1.9) (1.7)
Peanut Butter -12.8?? 122.2??? -0.6 -0.3??? 46.9??? -14.4?? 16.6
(5.2) (17.5) (1.0) (0.1) (6.8) (5.9)
Sugar 9.7??? 132.5??? 2.3??? -0.4??? 36.8??? -5.9 20.9
(3.8) (10.7) (0.7) (0.1) (4.8) (4.5)
Tissue -7.1? 104.5??? 0.2 -0.1 39.6??? -14.8??? 14
(4.3) (15.1) (0.6) (0.1) (5.1) (4.6)
Tuna 5.9??? 30.7??? -0.1 -0.1?? 76.9??? -36.6??? 20
(1.8) (4.0) (0.4) (0.0) (3.4) (3.1)
Note: (i) Each column reports estimated coecients (in percentage points) multiplying the indicated variable.
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are below each coecient in parentheses. The superscripts ?,
??, and ? ? ? indicate statistical signicance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Table A.1 in the appendix
reports analogous estimates from data where all sale prices were replaced with the most recent non-sale
price.
24each model's R2. To demonstrate that the key results from this exercise do not merely re
ect
sale prices, Table A.1 in the appendix reports the analogous estimates after rst replacing
each sale price with the most recent regular price.
Consider rst the model estimated with all products' data. The regressors together
explain 15:4 percent of the variation in the decision to change the nominal price. As Figure 5
suggests, the regression function is convex in the relative price.17 The coecients multiplying
linear and squared terms in lagged units have approximately equal magnitude and opposite
signs. The coecient multiplying the squared inverse price age is negative but less than
half the magnitude of that multiplying the corresponding linear term. Thus, the regression
function strictly decreases in the price's age.
Because the sample size varies greatly across the categories, so does the precision of
the estimated coecients. The standard errors for the two categories with the fewest price
observations, Ketchup and Peanut Butter, are particularly large. For all categories, a joint
exclusion test for the two relative price terms rejects the null hypothesis at the one percent
level. All of the estimated coecients on the squared term are positive, as the convex hazard
in Figure 5 suggests.
The in
uence of lagged units sold on nominal adjustments varies more across the cate-
gories. For Peanut Butter and Tuna, only the squared term is individually signicant, and it
appears with a negative sign. Thus, prices that produce either extremely large or small sales
tend to be left alone. For Sugar, the coecient on the linear term is positive and signicant
while that on the quadratic term is small. This category's results conform to the intuition
from Golosov and Lucas (2007): A rm selling a large number of units facing a given menu
cost adjusts price more frequently than a rival selling fewer units because the return to the
adjustment is larger. For Ketchup though, the coecient on the linear term is negative and
17Figure 5 might suggest that the probability of a price change is a function of relative price's absolute
value or another piecewise linear function. We have experimented with such specications and obtained very
similar results to those reported here.















































signicant. Overall, only the results for Sugar conform to the intuition of Golosov and Lucas
(2007).
Finally, consider the coecients multiplying the inverse of the price's age. The coecients
on the linear term are all positive and statistically signicant at the one percent level. Those
multiplying the squared term are negative and statistically signicant except for Margarine.
The two coecients are jointly statistically signicant at the 1 percent level for all categories.
Figure 8 plots the estimated hazard functions. We choose the intercepts so that the hazard
for a newly set price equals 47 percent as in Figure 3. The hazards all decline with age.
A variable's statistical signicance indicates that it has some forecasting value, but it
does not show that it matters quantitatively. To assess each variable's contribution to
the forecasts, Table 7 reports root mean-squared errors (in percentage points) from several
specications of the linear-in-probabilities model. The rst column reports the in-sample
rmse's from forecasting price changes with only a constant. Their maximum possible value
26Table 7: Root Mean-Squared Errors(i)
Store, UPC, & Date Indicators plus Quadratic in
Category Constant ; Relative Price & Units Sold(ii) & Inverse Age(iii)
All Products 43.2 41.7 41.6 41.5 39.9
Ketchup 44.4 43.4 43.3 43.2 42.2
Margarine 43.2 41.6 41.4 41.4 39.6
Peanut Butter 45.2 43.5 43.2 43.1 41.8
Sugar 40.4 38.7 37.7 37.6 36.3
Tissue 41.3 39.6 39.4 39.4 38.7
Tuna 43.8 41.5 41.5 41.4 39.6
Notes: (i) The table's entries are in-sample root mean-squared errors (in percentage points) from forecasts
of I fpi;t 6= pi;t 1g based on linear-in-probabilities models that include the specied set of regressors. The
maximum possible value for these is 50. (ii) The linear-in-probabilities models underlying these results include
quadratic terms in the relative price and units sold. (iii) The linear-in-probabilities models underlying these
results include quadratic terms in the relative price, units sold, and the inverse duration.
is 50 percent. The remaining columns report the rmse's from models with progressively
richer specications for xi;t. The second column corresponds to a model which includes only
the dummy variables for the store, product, and calendar date. These variables lower the
rmse's from 1:0 to 2:3 percentage points. The third column gives the results from models
that add the two relative price terms, and the fourth column has results from adding the
terms in lagged units sold to that specication. For all categories but Sugar, adding these
variables lowers the rmse's very little. For the nal column, we added the two terms in the
price's inverse age to the fourth column's specication. This yields the same denition of xi;t
used in the original regression analysis. The rmse's drop from 0:7 to 1:9 percentage points.
For all categories, the price's age is the most quantitatively useful forecaster of nominal
adjustments.
276 Robustness
In this section, we document robustness to changes in measurement strategy. We begin by
showing that the results hinge on neither the correction for time aggregation nor the specic
denition of a sale price. Firms ultimately control stores' prices, so we also explore the
consequences of using a rm's average price for an item (across its stores) as the unit of
analysis. We conclude with a brief discussion of other empirical characterizations of time
dependence, which indicate that the declining hazard function manifests itself in data sets
collected to create the CPI.
6.1 Measurement Choices
Three measurement decisions permeate the results: the correction for time aggregation and
measurement error based on fractional prices, the denition of a sale, the decision not to
replace prices that dier from a common preceding and following price. To examine the
importance of the time aggregation and measurement error correction, we recomputed every
table and gure after rounding all prices to the nearest whole cent and without the correction
as described in Section 2. Unsurprisingly, removing the time aggregation correction increases
the frequency of price adjustment and decreases the average price duration, from 23 to 34
percent and from 8:3 to 6:4 weeks. However, this modication leads to no other substantial
changes. We noted in Section 2 the possibility that prices which follow and preceed exactly
the same price are errors. Replacing such prices with their bracketing price decreases the
frequency of price adjustment to 17 percent and increases the average price duration to 13:1
weeks, but it leaves the paper's central results intact. Given the scarcity of sale prices as
we dene them, one might speculate that our denition is too conservative. We investigated
this by adopting an alternative which required a price to drop at least 5 percent (instead of
10 percent) and fully recover within four weeks (instead of two weeks). Here also, the only
substantial change to the results was unsurprising: the frequency of sale prices rose from 3:4
28to 7:8 percent.
6.2 Other Variables
We have examined the robustness of our linear in probabilities estimates to alternative
specications. The rst adds UPC-specic calendar-date dummies. We use these to control
for variation over time in individual products' wholesale prices. Just as the original estimates,
the linear and quadratic terms in the inverse age are jointly signicant in every category.
The hazards decline less than those in Figure 8, but they still decline substantially. From
this, we conclude that the estimated declining hazard does not arise only from producer
price dynamics.
Although macroeconomic models of price setting typically consider the decision to adjust
a single good's price, Lach and Tsiddon (1996) document that stores selling multiple products
typically change their prices simultaneously. We added the fraction of other prices at the
same store changing in the same week. We expect that changing more prices in the store
lowers the cost of changing a price, so its associated coecient should be positive. Indeed,
the fraction of other prices being changed in the current week always has a positive and
signicant coecient. Adding this variable substantially increases the regressions' R2 values,
but it changes the point estimates and statistical signicance of the other coecient estimates
only little. We conclude that price synchronization contributes to the understanding of price
changes in these data, but it does not account for the declining hazard.
6.3 Other Data Sets
One might wonder whether this paper's results (particularly the declining hazard function)
only arise in the ERIM data. We conclude our robustness checks with a discussion of the
existing evidence on this point. Dhyne et al. (2006) report that the hazard function for
nominal adjustment decreases when measured with monthly CPI data in nearly every Euro
zone country. These authors did not examine the hazard function after rst controlling for
29heterogeneity across store-product cells, so all we can say is that existing evidence from
the Euro zone is consistent with a decreasing hazard like that we document. The results
of Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) are more supportive. They have conrmed that this
paper's nding of a decreasing hazard function holds good in U.S. data used to construct
the CPI even after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity across product-store cells. Eden
and Jaremsky (2009) estimate the price-change hazard with scanner data from Dominik's, a
large Chicago-area grocery chain. They also nd a decreasing hazard rate for price changes,
even after omitting changes to and from sale prices. As a further robustness check, we have
calculated analogues to all of this paper's tables and gures using the Stanford Market Basket
database used by Bell and Hilber (2006). Those data come from ve grocery stores owned
by four rms in Chicago's Gold Coast/Lincoln Park neighborhod. Those data also display
all three of our principle results{ the hazard for price changes declines with the price's age;
extreme prices are more likely to be changed; and extreme prices tend to be young. Overall,
the available evidence indicates that the declining hazard is not an idiosyncratic feature of
the ERIM data.
7 Conculsion
Price setting in the ERIM scanner data displays state dependence: Increasing the dierence
between the current price and the average of other stores prices for the same good raises the
probability of that nominal price changing. Our other two results present a greater challenge
to conventional theories of costly price adjustment. Prices in the tails of the distribution are
younger than average, and the hazard for nominal price adjustment decreases with time.
What do these results mean? One heuristic description is that they combine experimen-
tation and inattention. A producer unsure of the prot-maximizing price tries several and
eventually settles on one. This price remains in place until trying to improve upon it becomes
worthwhile. With this in mind, we have worked with a toy model of a monopolist learning
30her demand curve. She sells a single product to a high-value consumer who always purchases
the good and to a low-value consumer whose store visits are governed by a Markov chain.
The monopolist only observes the price and the number of units sold. Her optimal behavior
requires her to punctuate long stretches of high prices with occasional sales to detect the
low-value consumer's presence. If such an experiment succeeds, the low price sticks until the
low-value consumer leaves. Otherwise, the price returns to its high value. It is not hard to
see that this model's hazard function initially decreases. This qualitative success leads us
to believe that further development of similar models will improve our understanding of this
paper's evidence.
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34Table A.1: Linear-in-Probabilities Estimates using Sale-Replacement Records(i)
Relative Price Lagged Units Sold Inverse Age
Category Linear Squared Linear Squared Linear Squared R2
All Products 6.4??? 36.4??? -0.7??? 0.0 27.2??? 7.0??? 15.1
(1.1) (2.5) (0.2) (0.0) (1.4) (1.3)
Ketchup -5.6 49.5??? -1.9??? 0.1 30.4??? -0.2 13.1
(5.2) (18.6) (0.7) (0.1) (6.7) (6.2)
Margarine 9.9??? 33.3??? -0.7??? 0.0 22.1??? 11.3??? 15.2
(1.6) (3.6) (0.2) (0.0) (1.8) (1.7)
Peanut Butter -15.8??? 90.7??? -0.9 -0.2??? 29.7??? 1.7 15.6
(5.1) (14.4) (0.7) (0.1) (6.3) (5.7)
Sugar -14.3??? 70.7??? 1.4??? -0.2??? 12.1??? 21.1??? 18.7
(4.9) (13.7) (0.5) (0.1) (4.6) (4.5)
Tissue -7.2? 80.2??? -1.0?? 0.1 18.0??? 7.8? 13.7
(4.0) (18.4) (0.4) (0.0) (4.5) (4.3)
Tuna 8.0??? 31.2??? -0.8??? 0.0 40.4??? -2.1 20.6
(1.9) (3.3) (0.3) (0.0) (3.2) (3.0)
Note: (i) Each column reports estimated coecients (in percentage points) multiplying the indicated variable.
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are below each coecient in parentheses. The superscripts ?,
??, and ? ? ? indicate statistical signicance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.
35Table A.2: Root Mean-Squared Errors using Sale-Replacement Records(i)
Store, UPC, Date, & Sale Indicators plus Quadratic in
Category Constant ; Relative Price & Units Sold(ii) & Inverse Age(iii)
All Products 40.7 39.5 39.5 39.5 37.7
Ketchup 41.2 40.4 40.4 40.2 38.9
Margarine 41.4 40.1 40.1 40.0 38.3
Peanut Butter 42.9 41.5 41.4 41.3 39.8
Sugar 36.4 35.0 34.9 34.8 33.1
Tissue 36.6 35.3 35.3 35.2 34.3
Tuna 40.8 38.9 38.9 38.9 36.7
Notes: (i) The table's entries are in-sample root mean-squared errors (in percentage points) from forecasts
of I fpi;t 6= pi;t 1g based on linear-in-probabilities models that include the specied set of regressors. The
maximum possible value for these is 50. (ii) The linear-in-probabilities models underlying these results include
quadratic terms in the relative price and units sold. (iii) The linear-in-probabilities models underlying these
results include quadratic terms in the relative price, units sold, and the inverse duration.
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